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This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal and labormarket policies in a
small open developing country. The basic framework considersan economy with a large
informal production sector and a heterogeneous work force. Thelabor market is segmented as
a result of efficiency considerations and minimumwage laws. The basic model is then extended
to account for unemployment benefits, income taxation, andimperfect labor mobility across
sectors.
Under the assumption of perfect labor mobility, we show thata permanent reduction in
government spending on nontraded goods leads in the long run to a depreciation of thereal
exchange rate, a fall in the market-clearing wage for unskilled labor,an increase in output of
traded goods, and a lower stock of net foreign assets. Apermanent reduction in the minimum
wage for unskilled workers improves competitiveness, and expands the formalsector at the
expense of the informal sector. Hence, in a two-sector economy in which the minimumwage
is enforced only in the formal sector andwages in one segment of the labor market are
competitively determined, efficiency wage considerations do not alter the standard neoclassical
presumption. A reduction in unemployment benefits is also shown to havea positive effect on
output of tradable goods by lowering both the level of efficiencywages and the employment rent
of skilled workers.
Pierre-Richard Agénor Joshua Aizenman
Research Department Department of Economics
International Monetary Fund Dartmouth College
Washington, D.C. 20431 Hanover, NH 03755
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Studies of urban labor markets indeveloping countries have come
to distinguish between the formal and informalsectors on the basis of
whether employment relationships aresubject or not to various labor
market regulations and other institutionalconstraints.' In the
formal sector, which consists of medium- and
large-scale enterprises,
workers are entitled to a variety ofbenefits, such as minimum
standards for working conditions, jobsecurity provisions, social
security and disability protection, pensionplans, and health
insurance.Skilled and unskilled workers are hiredthrough formal
contracts, with labor unions (or collective
bargaining mechanisms)
playing in some countries an important role in thedetermination of
wages.The degree of compliance with minimumwage laws may vary
considerably across production sectors. Bycontrast, in the informal
segment of the urban labor market- -which includes
Self-employed
individuals and small privately-owned
enterprises producing mainly
services and other nontradables- -laborregulations are usually not
enforced.Activities in this sector relymostly on the direct
provision of labor services by owners and theirfamilies. Paid labor
is used (usually withoutany formal employment contract) only
occasionally. Although the informal labor market is characterizedby
free entry, job insecurity ispervasive, wages are highly flexible,
and workers get very few benefits from theiremployers. Minimum wage
laws do not apply or are notconsistently enforced, and collective
bargaining plays a limited role in the determination ofwages.
By most accounts, the informal sectorrepresents a sizable
1See, for instance, Mazumdar(1983) and Turnhani (1993).Rural
labor markets, which account for a substantialcomponent of employment
in many developing countries, are characterizedby a large share of
self-employed persons and unpaid family workers.Wage earners bound
by explicit contracts are also employed in agriculture, but isa less
common occurence.-2-
proportion- -between 30 and 60 percent- -of economicactivity and total
employment in developing countries, particularly insome parts of
Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.2 Aconsequence of the
formal-informal dualism induced by the lack ofenforcement of
government legislation is the segmentation of the urban labormarket,
which plays a crucial role inexplanations of urban poverty,
unemployment and underemployment in developingcountries. Labor
market segmentation can be definedas a situation where, because of
barriers- -institutionalor otherwise- -tooccupational mobility between
sectors, a worker in the "low-wage" sector does not havefull access
to a job in the "high-wage" sector heldby an observationally
identical worker (Taubman and Wachter,1986). If there were no
barriers, workers in the low-wage sector wouldenter the high-wage
sector and bid wages down untilearnings across sectors were
equalized. More succintly, labor marketsegmentation implies
persistent wage differentials forobservationally identical workers.
The best-known model of labor marketsegmentation in developing
countries was developed by Harris and Todaro(1970), in their attempt
to explain the persistence ofmigration from rural to urban areas,
despite the existence of widespread urbanunemployment. A key feature
of the model is the equality of
expected (rather than actual) wages in
the urban sector and the ruralareas as the basic equilibrium
condition of the labor market.Harris and Todaro showed that the
existence of a binding minimumwage in the urban sector leads, even if
the rural labor market iscompetitive, to a persistent wage
differential between the rural and urbansectors and to the emergence
of urban unemployment.
In the Harrjs-Todaro framework,as in many models of labor market
adjustment, labor is homogeneous andperfectly mobile across sectors.
2See Rosenzveig(1988) and Turnharn (1993).Empirical estimates
usually measure ernployement in the informalsector as the sum of self-
employed workers, unpaid family workers, anddomestic workers.
Existing data must, however, be interpreted withcare.-3-
Labor market segmentation emerges as a result of thegovernjflenc
imposing a minimumwagein urban areas. However, an important feature
of urban labor markets in developing countries- -and,indeed, of labor
markets everywhere- -isthe observation that workers are endowed with
different skills, and may face short-term constraintson mobility
across sectors as well as across different skill categories. In
addition, wage differentials may emerge not only as a resultof
institutional constraints but also as aconsequence of firms'
wage-setting decisions aimed at enhancing productivity of agiven
category of workers.Labor force heterogeneity, imperfect sectoral
mobility, and productivity considerations add new dimensions to the
analysis of labor market segmentation.In particular, they provide
important elements for examining potential spillover effectsacross
different segments of the labor market, and the behavior ofsectoral
wages. Accounting for these features has important implications for
understanding the effects of macroeconomic and structural policy
shocks in developing countries.3
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of fical and
labor market policies on output, wages, and unemployment ina dynamic,
general equilibrium model of a small open developingeconomy with a
large informal sector and segmented labor markets.Our analysis is
based on the prevalent view among development economists that the
absence- -or lack of enforcement- -ofgovernment regulations is the
defining characteristic of the informal sector.Section II develops
the basic framework, which distinguishes between skilled and unskilled
labor and assumes perfect mobility across sectors, and examines the
effect of changes in government expenditure and the minimumwage paid
to unskilled workers on the composition of employment.Section III
introduces income taxation and unemployment benefits, and analyzes how
these modifications affect the determination of equilibriumwages,
3The implications of labor marketsegmentation in the absence of
worker heterogeneity have been examined by Agénor and Santaella (1993)
and Demekas (1990) in a short-term macroeconomic context, and by
Edwards (1988) in the context of trade and structural reforms..4-
productivity, and employment.Section IV extends further the basic
framework to consider the case wheremobility of unskilled workers
between the formal and informal sectors isimperfect. Finally,
Section V summarizes the main implications of thepaper and discusses
some possible extensions of the analysis.
II. A Basic Framework
Consider a small open economy in which thereare three types of
agents: producers, households, and the government. The economy
consists of two sectors: a formal sector, whichproduces a traded good
using skilled and unskilled labor, and the informalsector, which
produces a nontraded good, using only unskilled labor.4The relative
price of the traded good is determined by theequilibrium condition of
the nontraded good market.
The capital stock in each sector andthe composition of the labor
force between skilled and unskilledworkers are assumed fixed during
the time frame of theanalysis.Skilled and unskilled labor are
perfect substitutes in the production ofthe nontraded good in the
informal sector.Workers are assumed initiallyperfectly mobile
across sectors.A mininum wage for unskilled laborimposed by
government fiat exists, but is enforcedonly in the formal sector.
The wage rate for skilled laborin the formal sector is assumed seton
the basis of efficiency
considerations (taking into account workers'
opportunity earnings), leading to an above-equilibriumwage.5By
contrast, wages of unskilled workers in theinformal sector are fully
4Assuming that the formalsector produces also a nontraded good
would complicate theanalysis without yielding additional insight.
5There is bynow a voluminous literature in developed countries
that views involuntaryunemployment as the result of efficiencywages. See Weiss (1990) and, fora more critical view, Carmichael (1990).
Agénor and Santaella (1993) examine theimpact of macroeconomic policy
shocks in a two-sector model ofan open economy with homogeneous labor
and relative wage rigidity inducedby efficiency considerations.-5-
flexible.Once employment decisions for both categories of labor
skills are taken by producers in the formal sector, the informal
sector absorbs all workers that are not hired in the formal sector.
Since all skilled workers that are unable to find a job in the formal
sector are willing to work as unskilled labor in the production of the
nontraded good in the informal sector, unemployment cannotemerge- -
althoughlabor may be inefficiently allocated.Equilibrium of the
labor market in the informal sector obtains once total supply and
demand are equalized through wage adjustment.6
Households consume both traded and nontraded goods produced in
the formal and informal sectors, supply labor inelastically and holda
traded bond, which bears a real rate of return determined on world
markets.Domestic agents can borrow and lend freely at that rate,
which varies inversely with the economy's stock of bonds as well as
the composition of domestic output.The government consumes traded
and nontraded goods, and finances its expenditure by varying lump-sum
taxes on households. Finally, wage and employment expectations- -which
affect, as discussed in section IV, the decision to migrate across
sectors- -are assumed to depend on prevailing conditions in the labor
market.
1. Production, effort, and the labor market
The production technology in the formal sector is given by7
—
QF(eLS,LFLT), (1)
6The dichotomy inwage formation can be justified by assuming
that efficiency considerations result from firms' desire to avert
shirking (as discussed below) and minimize the cost of monitoring
workers' effort. Assume also, as argued in the introduction, that the
formal sector consists essentially of "large" firms, while the
informal sector consists only of "small" firms. A plausible
conjecture is therefore that small firms can monitor nearly costlessly
the level of effort produced by their workers, thus obviating the need
to pay efficiency wages.
7For convenience, time subscripts are omitted in what follows.
Except otherwise indicated, the total derivative of a function of a
single argument is denoted by a prime.-6-
where denotes output, e the level of effortper skilled worker
(which is bounded between 0 and unity by an appropriate choiceof
units), Ls employment of skilled workers andL employment of
unskilled workers, both measured in natural units.Production takes
place under decreasing returns to both categories of labor, whichare
assumed to be imperfectly substitutable. Setting the worldprice of
traded goods to unity, the domestic price ofoutput of the formal
sector is equal to the nominal exchange rate, E, which isassumed
fixed in what follows.
The first step in the analysis of productiondecisions is to
determine the level of effort that firms in theformal sector will
demand from skilled workers.Assume that consumption and effort
decisi,ns are separable, and that the decisionto provide effort
depends only on the wage earnedand the disutility of effort. All
workers share the same instantaneousutility function u(,e) which,
after appropriate normalizations, is definedas 1n[w(l-e)1J, where
0 <-y<1.8Let ir denote the probability (per unittime) that a
skilled worker is detectedshirking, in which case he is fired and
must seek employment as an unskilled workerin the informal sector.
The level of effort providedby skilled workers is positive (when
employed and not shirking) or zero (whenshirking while employed, or
when working in the informalsector). The optimal effort level of a
skilled worker is determinedso that the expected utility derived from
working is at least equal to the expectedutility of shirking:
hh''s+ (l-i)ln(1-e)￿ +(l-)-ylnws, (2)
where — denotesthe real product wage of skilled workers in
the formal sector, — thereal wage (measured in terms of
traded goods) paid to unskilledworkers in the informal sector, and
8Thequantity l-e could be viewed here as measuringleasure,
although the supply of hours is assumed fixedfor both categories of
workers (see below).-7-
(respectively wu) the nominal wage in the formal (respectively
informal) sector. The left-hand side in expression (2) measures the
expected utility derived by a skilled worker who is not shirking and
provides a level of effort equal to e, while the right-hand side
measures the expected utility of a shirking worker as a weighted
average of the wage earned if caught shirking and fired (with
probability ir), and if not caught (with probability 1 -ir)--inwhich
case the level of effort is zero.9
The level of effort demanded by firms is assumed to be such that
skilled workers are indifferent between shirking and not shirking- -in
which case workers choose not to shirk--so that condition (2) holds
with equality. Solving for the required level of effort yields
e —1- U
— > 0 (3)
"S 1-7
Equation (3) shows that the level of effort produced by skilled
workers depends positively on the real wage in the formal sector and
negatively on the real wage in the informal sector, which measures the
opportunity cost of effort.It can readily be established that the
marginal effect of an increase in the real wage in the formal sector
on effort is positive but decreasing, and that an increase in the
probabilibty of getting caught shirking raises the level of effort.
The representative producer in the formal sector maximizes its
9ourformalizationof the decision process that workers face
shares some common features with the well-known shirking model of
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).It differs, however, in two crucial
aspects.First, the choice of an effort level in our framework is
continuous, while it is a discrete one in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
Second, in our framework it is only the current market conditions that
matter while in the Shapiro-Stiglitz framework workers form their
decisions on the basis of the expected discounted utility stream
associated with alternative options. We have provided in a different
context (Agénor and Aizenman, 1994) an extension of the Shapiro-
Stiglitz model to the labor market setup considered here.-8-
real profits, that is, using equations (1) and (3) andassuming that










where denotes the legally-set minimum realwage (measured in terms
of traded goods) for unskilled workers, which is assumedbinding in
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Optimality conditions (4a) and (4b) can be solved toyield:
1/a — a—(l+a) >1 (5)
which indicates that, inequilibrium, formal-sector firms always set
the efficiency wage for skilledworkers at a higher level than the
opportunity cost of effort. A graphical determination of the
efficiency wage is shown in Figure 1.11Note that skilled workers'
'°Equations (4) yield thestandard Solow condition, which indi-
cates that in equilibrium theelasticity of effort with respect to the
product wage must be equal tounity. See Weiss (1990).
'11f we had assumedthat skilled workers provide a minimum level
of effort e when shirking whileemployed in the formal sector or when
hired in the informalsector, the term (l--y)lne would have appeared
on the right-hand side of equation(2) and the level of effort that-9-
equilibrium wage depends only on the going wage in the informal
sector, and not on the minimum wage for unskilled workers in the
formalsector. This is because the only employment opportunity
available to a skilled worker who loses his job in the formal sector
as a result of inadequate performance is to join the informal sector
labor force.
Equations (3) and (5) imply that in equilibrium effort is
constantat—l-c—a/(l+a).Substituting the optimal value of
from equation (5) in equation (4a), and solving the resulting equation
together with (4c) determines the equilibrium effort level and the
demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the formal sector:
—+ + —







An increase in the market-clearing wage for unskilled workers
reduces the demand for skilled labor but has an ambiguous effect on
the demand for unskilled labor in the formal sector.A rise in the
real wage in the informal sector increases in the same proportion as
the efficiency wage paid to skilled workers in the formal sector, thus
maintaining effort constant.The resulting increase in labor costs
lowers the demand for skilled workers.An increase in the minimum
wage reduces the demand for unskilled workers but has an ambiguous
effect on the demand for skilled workers. As shown in Appendix I, a
sufficient condition for both ambiguities to disappear is that the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in the
production of traded goods should not too large- -a fairly plausible
assumption in practice.




wouldobtain when the wage ratio is unity would be einsteadof 0.- 10-
whichindicates that, given the condition discussed above, thepartial
equilibrium effect of an increase in either the minimumwage for
unskilled workers or the market-clearing wage in the informal sector
on output of traded goods is unambiguously negative.
Production in the informal sector is subject todecreasing
returns to unskilled labor and is written as
Q1 —Q1(L1), >0,
Qj.'< 0, (8)




where Liu denotes employment of unskilled workers inthe informal
sector, z — thereal exchange rate, andP1 the price of the
nontraded good produced in the informal sector.Profit maximization
yields the familiar equality between marginal revenue andmarginal
cost, —z1Q,from which labor demand can be derived as
—QjJ(ZC)U)— 14u(ZW) <0 (10)
where zw measures the real productwage in the informal sector.
Substituting this result in (8) implies
—0i'&. C;<0 (11)
From equations (7) and (11), real factorincome--measured in
termsoftraded goods- -isgiven by
-1 *
q—zQi(zwu) +QFu,wU). (12)
Letdenote total labor supply in theeconomy, and the pool
of skilled workers.The pool of unskilled workers is thus given by- 11-
—- Asindicated above, firms in the formal sector determine
the real efficiency wage of skilled workers and make their employment
decisions first, hiring randomly from the existing work force until
their optimal demand for labor is satisfied. Skilled workers who are
unable to obtain employment in the formal sector become suppliers in
the secondary market and, together with demand there, determine the
wage that equilibrates the market for unskilled labor. Formally, the
equilibrium condition of the unskilled labor market is given by




which can be solved for the equilibrium value of
—c(zj).
(14)
Equation (14) shows that the market-clearing wage for unskilled
workers is inversely related to the legal minimum wage and the real
exchange rate. An increase in the minimum wage lowers the demand for
both categories of workers in the formal sector and increases the
supply of labor in the informal sector, exerting a downward pressure
on real wages there. A real exchange rate depreciation dampens the
demand for unskilled workers in the informal sector, requiring a fall
in the real wage (measured in terms of traded goods) to maintain
equilibrium of the unskilled labor market.
2. Consumption and asset accumulation
Households supply labor in quantity L and consume traded and
nontraded goods produced by the formal and informal sectors.The
representative household's lifetime discounted utility is given by'2
'2For clarity, only the consumption part of households' utility is
explicitly specified in equation (15), since consumption and effort
decisions were assumed to be separable. To simplify calculations, the
instantaneous utility derived from total consumption is taken to be
logarithmic, while consumption itself is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas- 12-
I 1n[cI(t)&cF(t)l]etdt,
> 0 (15)
where fidenotesthe constant rate of time preference, c1 consumption
of nontraded goods, and ,consumptionof traded goods.
Household hold an internationally traded bond, the stock of which
b is assumed to evolve over time according to
-1 b —pb+ q -zC1- CF-r, (16)
where idenotesreal lump-sum taxes (measured in terms of traded
goods), and p the world interest rate. We assume in what follows that
households' initial position is one of net indebtedness (b0 < 0). The
interest rate facing the country considered varies inversely with the
economy's total stock of foreign assets and positively with the




where QandQdenotethe long-run values of Q1 and Q.'4
functionin the two categories of goods.
'3See Agénor and Santaella(1993) for a discussion of the first
effect. The formulation used here captures the idea that the world
interest rate faced by a small country is a function not only of the
existing level of debt but also of the potential capacity to repay,
which in turn depends on the economy's ability to produce tradedgoods
as opposed to nontraded goods in the long run.See Aizenman (1989b)
for a discussion of the role ofopenness in determining the
country-specific interest rate on world markets.
'4For simplicity, weassume p() to be continuously differentiable.
More generally, the function could have a "kink" at a critical value
of the stock of bonds.We also impose p(O,.) —, whichfixes the
real interest rate, for a zero level of net indebtedness, to the rate
of time preference.- 13-
Householdstreat q, z, p and r as given and maximize (15) subject
to (16) by choosing a sequence (cI.cF.b}t_o.The solution to this





in addition to (16) and the transversality condition 1i1n(btet) —0.
p, the costate variable associatedwith the asset accumulation
equation, measures the shadow value of wea1th.
Equation (18a) yields c —cF(P)with c <0.Substituting this
result in equation (18b) yields the demand for nontraded goods
produced by the informal sector.Using this result together with
equation (11), the equilibrium condition for the nontraded goods





where denotes government spending on goods produced in the informal
sector of the economy.
To close the model requires specifying the behavior ofthe
government. Public revenue consists of lump-sum taxes onhouseholds,
and public spending consists only of expenditure on nontraded goods.
To ensure solvency, we assume that the government maintains spending
on traded and nontraded goods at a constant levelin real terms and
adjusts lump-sum taxes to balance the budget:
—+ z11.
(20)- 14-
3.Dynamics of fiscal and labor market policies
We now examine the short- and long-run effects of fiscal and
labor market policies.To do so, it is convenient to re-write the




Adepreciation of the real exchange rate has a positive effect on
the supply of traded goods in the formal sector- -sinceit reduces the
market-clearing wage for unskilled workers- -but the net effect of an
increase in the minimum wage is in general ambiguous.On the one
hand, it reduces directly the demand for unskilled workers.On the
other hand, it reduces the market-clearing wage for unskilled workers
in the informal sector as well as, through the efficiency condition
(5), the real efficiency wage for skilled workers, thus raising
employment and output. We will determine below the conditions under
which the net effect can be unambiguously signed.
Substituting equation (14) in the equilibrium condition of the







In general, the net effect of a real depreciation on output in
the informal sector is ambiguous.On the one hand, a real
depreciation raises directly the product wage in the informal sector,
thus exerting a negative effect on output.On the other hand, it
reduces indirectly the product wage since it leads to a fall in the
real wage of unskilled workers in the informal sector, which in turn
lowers the real wage of skilled workers- -inorder to maintain constant
the level of effort- -In the formal sector. The resulting increase in
the supply of labor in the informal sector exerts a downward pressure- 15-
onthe real wage earned by unskilled workers, which may be large
enough to dominate the upward direct effect associated with a
depreciation of the real exchange rate on the real product wage there.
As shown in Appendix I, the direct effect will dominate if as assumed
before the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labor in the production of traded goods is not too large.





Substituting equations (12), (19) and (20) in equation (16)
yields
—p(b,Q7Q)b+ q[Z( g1,i.)w11)) - - cF(JA), (23)
which determines the rate of accumulation of traded bonds.Finally,
equation (18c) can be re-written as, using (17):
* *
IL/p —- 'I"F (24)
Equations (23) and (24) determine the behavior of foreign assets
and the marginal utility of wealth over time. Given the solution for
p, equation (22) determines the equilibrium levelof the real exchange
rate.
A linear approximation around the steady state to equations (23)
and (24) yields
*3 *
p 0 .p(..i) pp
—
3q1ôz3CF * op * , (25)
b b(-)+p b -b
where and b* denote the steady-state solutions of the system. We- 16-
willassume in what follows that d(pb)/db >0,or that the net effect
of an increase in the economy's total stock of debt is an increase in
interest payments. This assumption follows from the observation that
it is generally inefficient for a small country to operate in a region
where the supply of credit is backward bending (see Aizenman, 1989a).
The system described by (25) is locally saddlepoint stable.15The
steady-state equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2.Curves [jt— 0]and
(— 0]give combinations of p and b for which the marginal utility of
wealth and the stock of bonds remain constant. The negatively-sloped
saddlepath SS leads to the steady-state equilibrium at point E.16
Consider a permanent, unanticipated reduction at t— 0in
government spending on nontraded goods.The dynamics of adjustment
are illustrated in Figure 3.A permanent reduction in government
spending implies that there is an incipient excess supply of nontraded
goods (for a given level of external debt), inducing a real
depreciation--a drop in the relative price of the non-traded goods.
Furthermore, the long-term openness of the country improves, reducing
the interest rate p facing the country. For a given marginal utility
of wealth there is an incipient current account surplus, which induces
a leftward shift in the [1— 0]curve. The improvement in the
creditworthiness of the country implies that the long-run equilibrium
calls for higher indebtedness, shifting the[ii —0]curve also
leftwards. The new long-run equilibrium obtains at point E', with the
associated saddlepath denoted S'S'. On impact, both the drop in the
interest rate facing the country and the drop in the relative price of
non-traded goods increase the consumption of both types of goods,
reducing the shadow value of wealth, moving the economy in the
'5Given our sign assumptions, the determinant of the coefficient
matrix in equation (25) is negative.Note that this condition holds
irrespective of the value taken by d(pb)/db.
16The slope of the (i— 0]curve would be positive if we had
assumed that d(pb)/db < 0. ut since the slope of SS does not depend
on this derivative,the dynamics of the model would remain
qualitatively the same.- 17-
short-runto point A. The move from point E to point A is associated
with a reduction in the production of nontraded goods, a drop in
(see equation (14)), and a consequent increase inthe production of
traded goods.However, the increase in consumption of traded goods
exceeds the increase in production of the formal sector, and the net
effect is a current account deficit. Over time, the external
imbalance increases gradually the indebtedness of the country, moving
the economy from point A to point E'. In the transition towards the
new long-run equilibrium, the real exchange rate depreciates gradually
while consumption of traded goods falls, in order to accommodate the
greater deficit in the service account.
Consider now a permanent, unanticipated reduction in the minimum
wage for unskilled workers.The drop in the minimum wage affects
production in the formal sector via two channels. The direct effect
is to increase the demand for unskilled workers in the formal sector,
thus increasing production.The indirect effect is a reduction in
labor supply in the informal sector, which therefore leads to an
increase in the market-clearing wage for unskilled workers. This in
turn translates, through the efficiency condition (5), in an upward
adjustment in the real wage earned by skilled workers.Thus, while
the direct effect increases employment of unskilled workers in the
formal sector, the indirect effect works towards a reduction in
employment of skilled workers.In Appendix I we derive the sum of
these effects, and show that there is a strong presumption thatthe
direct effect will dominate.17 Hence, the presence of efficiency wages
and segmented labor markets does not alter theneoclassical
presumption in the two-sector framework considered here: areduction
in the minimum wage that is enforced only in the formal sector
improves the competitiveness of the country, leading to anexpansion
of the formal sector and a contraction of the informal sector.The
17More precisely, we show in Appendix I that the direct effect
dominates as long as the share of the informal sectoris large, the
substitutability between skilled and unskilled workersis not too
large, or the formal sector is labor intensive.- 18-
extentto which this result continues to hold under imperfect labor
mobility is discussed below.
The "pro-trade bias" associated with the drop in the minimumwage
implies that the adjustment path it induces will be qualitatively
similar to the transitional dynamics depicted in Figure 3. The
long-run reduction in the relative size of the informal sector
improves the creditworthiness of the country, shifting the curve
—0]leftwards. Similarly, the incipient excess supply of
nontraded goods induces a real depreciation, (that is, an increase in
z), shifting thereby the (b
—0]curve leftwards. Hence, the long-run
effects of a reduction in the minimum wage are also qualitatively
similar to those induced by a fall in government spending on goods
produced in the informal sector: both imply a pro-trade bias.
III. Taxation and Unemployment Benefits
In developing countries, taxation affect mostly firms and workers
operating in the formal sector- -ina similar manner to labor market
regulations.While this asymmetric feature of tax systems in the
developing world may veil be the optimal policy response given
administrative and othe institutional constraints, it may lead to
severe distortions in supply and demand decisions in the short run.
In this section, We generalize the framework developed above so as to
account for direct income taxation and unemployment benefits for
skilled workers in the formal sector, and examine how these
modifications affect the determination of sectoral wages, productivity
and the composition of employment.
Firms in the formal sector determine as before the optimal levels
of employment of both categories of labor as well as skilled workers'
wages, without facing a binding quantity constraint in either segment
of the labor market.However, instead of assuming that skilled
workers who are not hired in the formal sector enter the labor force- 19-
inthe informal sector, we now assume that unsuccessful applicants
choose to remain unemployed while perceiving a government-financed
unemployment benefit.' The unemployment insurance scheme is financed
in part by a tax on wage income, levied at the rate 0 << 1on
skilled workers employed in the production of traded goods.
Since skilled workers are now faced with a different opportunity
cost, the first step in examining the implications of the foregoing
assumptions is to determine their optimal level of effort.Suppose
for the moment that the unemployment benefit, denoted ,takesthe
form of a flat real wage. As before, the optimal level of effort is
determined so that the expected utility derived from working without
shirking be equal in equilibrium to the expected utility derived if
caught shirking. Condition (2) becomes now







whichindicates that skilled workers' effort depends negatively on the
rate of income taxation and positively on the level of unemployment
benefits.
'8Assuxning that only a given proportion of excess supply in the
market for skilled workers enters the unskilled labor force would not
have any qualitative effect on the analysis. We do not elaborate here
on reasons why skilled workers may refuse to work as unskilled labor
in the informal economy. Important considerations however are likely
to be the loss of social prestige that such a decision may entail, the
potentially adverse signaling effect towards future employers,search
efficiency (it may be easier to look for a formal-sector jobwhile
being unemployed), the perception that human capital may deteriorate
rapidly, thus hampering re-entry in the skilled labor force, orthat
the wage in the informal sector provides less utility than a
combination of leisure and unemployment benefit.- 20-
Assumingfor simplicity that government transfers consist only of
benefit payments to unemployed workers in the formal sector, the
government budget constraint (0) becomes
£CLS— 's - L)++ zg1. (20')
Using equation (27), it is straightforward to verify that in
equilibrium the efficiency wage for skilled workers is equal to
—c,4/(l-&), (28)




where both partial derivatives are negative.
The market-clearing wage for unskilled workers now depends
indirectly on the efficiency wage for skilled workers (since it
affects the demand for unskilled workers in the formal sector) but is
independent of the level of employment of skilled workers- -sincethere
is no "spillover" effect resulting from a job shortage for that
category of labor in the formal economy.The equilibrium condition





which can be solved forw.
Using the budget constraint (20'), and equations (29), (30) and
the dynamic equations driving the economy, we can now examine the
effect of a modification of the income tax rate and unemployment
benefits.Given that the level of emplo'9nent of skilled workers is- 21-
determinedby firms in the formal sector, the government budget
constraint (20') establishes a link between the income tax on wages,
and the level of unemployment compensation for high-ability workers.
As long as the elasticity of the demand for skilled workers (with
respect to their own wage) is small relative to the wage premium c,
higher unemployment compensation requires a higher tax rate for a
given level of employment of skilled workers. There exists, thus, an
unemployment Laffer curve which, as derived formally in Appendix II
and as displayed in Figure 4--drawn for a given level of the real
*
exchangerate--has an inverted U-shape in the i-space.Each wage
benefit level is thus supported by two tax rates. We can neglect the
higher one, obtaining an "efficient frontier," defined by the leftward
portion of the curve. At low levels of the wage benefit, the demand
for skilled labor is inelastic, and the efficient frontier is downward
sloping: lower unemployment compensation reduces the skilled workers'
wage (through the efficiency condition 28) and, for a given tax rate,
reduces tax revenue.Hence a higher tax rate is required.As we
reach a level of elasticity that is high enough, the curve becomes
upward sloping- -which correspondstothestage wherelower
unemployment compensation reduces the efficiency wage paid to skilled
workers, which in turn raises employment by an amount that is large
enough to reduce the total revenue needed to support the unemployment
compensation scheme.
Assuming that the economy operates on the upward-sloping portion
of the efficient frontier of the Laffer curve (between points A and B
in Figure 4), a lower level of unemployment compensation raises the
level of employment of skilled workers as a result oftwo
complementary effects. First, it reduces directly the efficiency wage
by lowering the opportunity cost of skilled workers' effort. Second,
it reduces the tax rate on skilled workers- -as a result of the
government budget constraint- -thusreducing the producer real wage
(see equation 28 for both effects). The net outcome is a higherlevel
of employment of skilled labor.This generates spillover effects,
increasing the demand for unskilled labor, bidding the market-clearing- 22-
wageup and reducing labor absorption inthe informal sector. Thus, a
lower level of unemployment benefits for skilled workersleads to an
expansion of the formal sector and a contractionof the informal
economy. The dynamic adjustment processis qualitatively similar to
the one depicted in Figure 3.
An alternative formulation of the unemployment benefit scheme is
to assume that the level of compensation is set as afunction of the




The relevant condition for deriving the effort function is given








where the level of effort depends now not only on the rate of
taxation, but also directly on the unemployment benefit rate 8, as
well as the minimum wage for unskilled workers. Solving as before the
optimization problem faced by producers in the formal sector yields a
relation of the form
(1-)"[a(l-)
-- a8(1-)—0,
wheredenotes the equilibrium level of effort. It can be shownthat
—+
— e(8,a), (33)
which indicates that in equilibrium, effort depends negatively on the
unemployment benefit rate and positively on the parameter a--and thus,
from equation (3), positively on the probability of getting caught
shirking- -but is independent from the income tax rate (as in the- 23-
previouscase) and the minimum wage for unskilled workers.




— 'u' a—___________ — a(8,) (34)
(l-e) 1cz- e
where is given by equation (33).An increase in the unemployment
benefit rate or in the income tax rate increase the relative rent
captured by skilled workers, measured by thecoefficient a.
Solving the complete model using equations (20'), (33)and (34),
we can now analyze the effect of a modificationof the unemployment
benefit rate, e.19 Suppose that we operate along the "correct" portion
of the unemployment Laffer curve, implying that a drop in e callsfor
a lower income tax rate.Applying (33) and (34) it follows that a
drop in the unemployment benefit rate willreduce the efficiency
coefficient a as a result of both a lower opportunity wage and alower
income tax rate, and will increase the equilibrium level ofeffort.
Applying the equilibrium conditions determining employmentin the
formal economy, it can be shown that output expands in theformal
sector and contracts in the informal sector, at a rate proportionalto
the difference between the increase in effort and the fall inskilled
workers' wage.20While the mechanism through which these results
obtain are qualitatively similar to those discussed in thefirst part
of this section, there is an additional channel in the present case
that reinforces the expansion of the formal sector: the resulting
increase in equilibrium effort.
'9The effects of a change in the income tax rate are qualitatively
similar to those discussed previously.
201f the production function in the formal sector is given by
equation (Al)inAppendix I, it can readily be shown that
-
1-S -'' - (l.)(l5eS
-
where0 < < 1are defined in Appendix I.- 24-
IV.LaborMobility, Sectoral Wages, and Unemployment
In the foregoing analysis, unskilled workers that were not hired
in the formal sector were able to join immediately the labor force in
the informal sector. By assuming that new entrants were successfully
bidding wages down, we obviated the possibility that involuntary
unemployment of that category of labor could emerge in equilibrium.
However, assuming perfect mobility across sectors may lack realism,
particularly in a short-run context.Workers typically incur a
variety of costs (such as relocation expenses or congestion costs)
that may prevent instant reallocation of the labor force.In this
section we consider the case where movements of unskilled labor across
sectors take place gradually, rather than instantaneously.We also
maintain the assumptions made in section II regarding the effort
decision of skilled workers and continue to take the composition of
the labor force as given. In this extended framework, unemployment of
both categories of labor may emerge in the long run.
As in the Harris-Todaro approach, potential migrants consider
alternative opportunities available to them in both sectors and
compare their expected utility in each location in order to choose the
option that maximizes their expected net utility gains. Suppose that
unskilled workers can only allocate time, not the level of effort.21
Formally, let denote total work time that an unskilled worker is
required to commit (in a lump-sum fashion), and t ￿ t the maximum
amount of leisure that he can possibly enjoy. Assuming as before that
consumption and labor supply decisions are separable, and that the
instantaneous utility of unskilled workers depends only on leisure and
the wage percieved, we have
21This assumption is consistent with the observation made above
that firms in the informal sector can readily monitor the level of
effort provided by their workers.Without loss of generality, we
normalize the constant level of effort to zero.- 25-
lnu(w,tu)
—-ylnw+ a1n(E-t). a > 0 (35)
where is the real wage earned by the worker, which depends on the
sector of employment.
Abstracting from migration and other relocation costs, the
expected utility derived from working in the formal sector consists of
two components. The first component is the utility derived from being
employed in the formal sector at the legal minimum wage, weighted by
the probability of being hired in that sector. This component obtains
by replacing w in (35) by and multiplying the resulting
expression- -assuming that hiring is random- -by the number of unskilled
workers actually employed in the formal economy over the number of
unskilled workers seeking jobs in the formal sector, L/L.22 The
second component is related to the possibility of being registered as
unemployedintheformalsectorandearningunemployment
benefits- -without allocating working time- -which is taken to represent
a fraction 0 < < 1 of the minimun wage.23 The expected utility in
this case obtains by replacing w in (35) by and setting —0,
and multiplying the resulting expression by the proportion of
unemployed unskilled workers in the total pool of unskilled workers
seeking jobs in the formal economy--that is, the probability of being
unemployed in the formal sector.Thus, expected utility conditional




)+ {71neL, + }FTJFU
22The absence of a forward-looking component in wage expectations
formed by unskilled workers may be justified by the existence of large
costs associated with search, and by the lack of sophistication of the
unskilled labor force.
23Note that the reason why the choice between being employed or
unemployed in the formal sector is not trivial is because unskilled
workers must supply labor in a lump-sum fashion. Put differently, t
is not a decision variable.- 26-
Bycontrast, expected utility derived from workingin the
informal sector obtains simply by replacing win equation (35) by the




The evolution over time of the unskilledlabor force in the
formal sector is thus given by
—Ic(E(uIF)-
wheredenotes the speed of adjustment. Straightforward manipulations






- denotesthe unemployment rate of unskilled
workers in the formal sector. In the long run, with —0,equation
(36) yields







whichindicates that an increase in the unemployment benefit rate or
the minimum wage raises the unemployment rate of unskilled workersin
the formal sector. By contrast, an increase in the market-clearing
wage in the informal sector lowers the unemploymentrate.This is
because it reduces the efficiency wage paid to skilled workers,raises
labor demand and output in the formal sector and thus employmentof
unskilled labor.
To obtain the overall unemployment rate for unskilledworkers,- 27-
notefirst that the distribution of the labor force of unskilled labor
is given by








The overall unemployment rate of unskilled workers, defined as
x —(E - isthus given by
XF d
I
so that in the steady state
X - (38)
Equation (38) indicates that in the steady state, an increasein
the minimum wage has an ambiguous effect on the overall unemployment
rate of unskilled workers.A rise in the market-clearing wage
(induced, for instance, by an increase in governemnt spending on goods
produced in the informal sector, g1) reduces overall unemploymentof
unskilled labor.
The aggregate unemployment rate is given by
L Ld LS Ld









where 0 << 1denotes the constant proportion of skilled workers in
the labor force.
Given the dynamic equation (36), the extended framework described
above can also be used to examine the short-run effects of fiscal and
labor market policies unemployment.By rewriting appropriately the
government budget constraint(20)24 and condensing the model yields now
a differential equation system in three variables:the marginal
utility of wealth, the stock of traded bonds, and the sizeof the
Labor force comprised of unskilled workers in the formal sector.
Although we omit mathenatical details here, it is intuitivelyclear
that the impact effect of a change in the fiscal and labor market
policy instruments discussed in previous sections will not alterthe
qualitative features highlightedbefore.25In particular, the net
effect of a reduction in government spending on aggregate output and
the unemployment rate is likely to be ambiguous on impact.
An important implication of the foregoing analysis, thus, is that
there may be no close relationship between changes in output and the
unemployment rate--that is, no stable Okun's law- -as a result of
spillover effects between the formal and informal segments of the
urbanlabor market. In periods of adverse macroeconomic shocks
24For instance, if government transfers consist of unemployment
benefits paid only to unskilled workers in the formal sector, and if
skilled workers continue to be subject to a tax on wages at the rate
&,thegovernment budget constraint (20) would become
d * d -1 — L)
+z
25This results, of course, from the fact that the proportion of
the unskilled labor force seeking employment in the formal sector
cannot change on impact. The transitional dynamics will in any case
differ, as shown by Agénor and Santaella (1993) in a somewhat similar
context.- 29-
(resulting,for instance, from cuts in government expenditure),
skilled and unskilled workers laid off in the formal sector may seek
employment in the informal sector, exerting downward pressure on wages
there. Although the wage efficiency effect is likely to dampen the
initial reduction in the work force of the formal sector, the sectoral
reallocation of labor- -which may be particularly marked in the absence
of unemployment benefits in the formal sector and non-prohibitive
relocation costs- -may lead to large shifts in the composition of
employment, with little effect on the aggregate unemployment rate. To
the extent that labor productivity is lower in the informal sector,
negative shocks to output will lead to a fall in average productivity
rather than as a rise in open unemployment.
The available evidence suggests indeed that spillover effects of
the type described above may have played a significant role in the
recent behavior of labor markets in developing countries.Figure 5
displays the behavior of output and the open unemployment rate over
time for a group of 12 developing countries during the 1980s.
26
Although the data must be interpreted with care,they seem to
indicate the absence of a stable relation between the rate of output
growth and unemployment.The more detailed evidence examined by
Horton et al. (1991), Riveros (1990) and Turnham (1993) also suggests
the occurence of large shifts in the composition of employment from
the formal to the informal sector in several countries in Latin
America, as well as in several other nations of Africa and Asia,
particularly during the recessionary years of the1980s.27
26Published measures of unemployment mostly includeonly
unemployed workers looking for jobs in the formal sector,but not
underemployed workers in the informal and rural sectors. The
effective degree of labor market slack may thus be understated.
27Perceived constraints on the level of employment in the formal
sector may also discourage job seeking and lead some workers to simply
drop out (at least temporarily) of the labor force, followingadverse
movements in output.Conversely, positive output shocks may lead to
large inflows into the labor force. This "discouragedworker" effect,
which is not captured in our framework, may also play arole in
explaining the low correlation between output andthe unemployment- 30-
VI.Summary and conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the implications of
fiscal and labor market policies on output, wages and unemployment in
a general equilibrium model of a small open developing economywith a
large informal sector, a heterogeneous work force, and segmented labor
markets.The production structure that we considered assumes that
while production in the formal sector consists of traded goods and
uses skilled and unskilled labor, output in the informal sector
consists of nontraded goods produced using only unskilled labor.
Firms in the formal sector were assumed to set the wage rate for
skilled labor so as to minimize labor costs per efficiency unit.
Skilled workers' effort was shown to depend positively on their wage
relative to the wage paid in the informal sector. Unskilled workers
employed in the formal sector were assumed to earn a legally-fixed
minimum wage, while wages of unskilled workers hired in the informal
sector were taken to be fully flexible. In equilibrium, as a result
of efficiency considerations, a noncompetitive wage differential
emerges across skill categories.The efficiency wage for skilled
workers, however, does not depend directly on the minimum wage.
Under the assumption of perfect labor mobility across sectors, we
showed that a permanent, unanticipated reduction in government
spending on nontraded goods leads in the long run to a depreciation of
the real exchange rate, a fall in the market-clearing wage for
unskilled labor, an increase in the production of traded goods, and a
lower stock of net foreign assets held by the private sector.A
permanent, unanticipated reduction in the minimum wage for unskilled
workers was also shown to increase output and the demand for labor in
rate in developing countries.In addition, firms cart dampen the
effect of output shocks on employment by varying hours of work
(through overtime), rather than through adjustment in the workforce.- 31-
theformal sector.Hence, in a two-sector economy in which the
minimum wage is enforced only in the formal sector and wages in one
segment of the labor market are competitively determined, efficiency
wage considerations do not alterthestandard neoclassical
presumption: a reduction in the minimum wage improves competitiveness,
and expands the formal sector at the expense of the informal sector.
The basic framework was subsequently extended to introduce direct
income taxation and unemployment benefits for skilled workers in the
formal sector. Assuming first that the unemployment benefit scheme
consisted of paying a constant real wage to the unemployed, we showed
that the economy faces an unemployment Laffer curve relating the
minimum wage and the income tax rate. If the economy operates on the
"correct" portion of the Laffer curve, a reduction in the level of
unemployment compensation wil raise the level of employment of skilled
workers- -thus leading to an expansion of the relative size of the
formal sector.If, alternatively, the unemployment benefit scheme is
assumed to link the level of compensation to the minimum wage for
unskilled workers and the after-tax wage for skilled workers, a
reduction in the unemployment benefit rate is also likely to lead to
an expansion of output, effort and employment in the formal sector- -at
a rate proportional to the difference between the increase in effort
and the fall in the premium associated with skilled workers' wage.
Finally, we considered the case where unskilled workers face a
decision to migrate from the informal sector to the formal sector. We
derived the incentive structure on the basis of which workers form
their decision, along the lines suggested by Harris and Todaro (1970).
By focusing the analysis on the long run, we showed thatthe overall
unemployment rate of unskilled workers varies inversely withthe
market-clearing wage for unskilled labor, but that a change in the
minimum wage for unskilled labor in the formal sector has an ambiguous
effect. An important prediction of the model, the absence of a stable
relation between output and unemployment in the short run, appeared to
be consistent with the available evidence for developing countries.- 32-
Theanalytical framework developed here can be further extended
in a variety of directions. One areaof investigation would be to
consider a situation where there existtechnological "input-output"
links between the formal and theinformal sectors. For instance, the
formal sector may be assumed to produce anintermediate good that is
used in the production processforinformal-sectorgoods.
ComplementaritY effects of this type are likelyto alter substantially
the effect of macroeconomic shocks on outputand the allocation of
labor across sectors.Another possibility would be to examine the
implications of alternatives to theHarris-Todaro intersectoral
migrationmechanism,perhapsbyintroducingthekindof
heterogeneities discussed by Lindbeck and Snower (1991).It may also
be useful to explore, in a growth context, theeffects of alternative
mechanisms that may account for movements overtime across skill
categories, thus explaining endogenously changesin the composition of
the labor force. Skill improvements take place through a varietyof
institutional forms, such as apprenticeship programs, on-the-job
training, and internal labor markets. At the same time,training may
impose a cost on firms and thus affect the sensitivityof the demand
for labor with respect to changes in current wages. Afinal issue of
importance would be to explain why government imposeminimum wage laws
in the first place--a phenomenon that creates, in our model,market
segmentation for unskilled workers. A political economyapproach may
provide the critical elements necessary to accountfor the incentives
to restrict wage flexibility.28 A sensible point of departure mightbe
the recognition that formal-sector workers may be better organized
(through pressure groups, for instance) than informal-sectorworkers,
and may thus have a greater ability to force incumbent policymakers
to
28A different approach is adopted by Drazen (1986), who argues
that minimum wage legislation may be welfare-improving- -relative to
the competitive equilibrium- -ina model where information aboutworker
quality is imperfect and labor quality rises withincreases in the
average market wage, as in urban labormarkets in developing
countries where entrants are migrants from rural areas.- 33-
legislatein their favor.
Although these extensions may prove valuable in their own right,
they are unlikely to alter some of the key resultsof this paper. In
particular, worker heterogeneity and labor market segrnentatation
(induced by institutional constraints and firms' optimizing behavior)
are essential elements in explaining the functioningof urban labor
markets in developing countries, and play a key role in the
transmission process of macroeconomic and structural policy shocks on
output and employment. In a setting where the level of employment is
determined by firms, policymakers will typically face a tradeoff in
using unemployment benefits and direct taxation of income.These
results have important implications for the design of macroeconomic
reform programs.- 34-
AppendixI
The purpose of this Appendix is to examine under what conditions
it is possible to sign unambiguously the effect of the minimumwageon
the supply of traded goods in the formal sector, and the effect of
changes in the real exchange rate on output of the informal sector.
To that effect, we assume that output in the formal sector is produced
with a Cobb-Douglas technology in capital and a composite labor input,
which takes the form of a CES function in skilled and unskilled labor.




where y measures the share of labor in production and Eacoefficient
related to the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor, which is equal to l/(l-E).
Maximizingprofitsintheformalsectoryields the
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where the result shown in (A2a) uses equation (5). Q/(l-4-a) denotes
the optimal level of effort1 which depends only on the parameter a.
















Since 1 - - €8<1, <0and <0.A sufficient
condition for both and to be negative is that e <-y,as
indicated in the text.
From equations (Al), eF— 7(esf:s+8L,f.U).Using (A3) yields
—" us+ (A4) 17
The production function in the informal sector is given by
Q1
—(L1)',
so that, using equation (10) in the text
iu
—-+ )/(l-i). (AS)
Theequilibrium condition of the labor market in the informal
sector (equation 13) can also be written as
-(1Y1du
+)n1
+ + —0, (A6)
where —
(Ls
+L)/imeasures the proportion of the total labor
force employed in the formal sector, and —1- Thecoefficient
FS —Ls/(Ls+L)measuresthe proportion of skilled workers in
total employment in the formalsector,and —1-n.- 36-
Substitutingequations (A3) and (A5) in (A6) yields




From (A4), we have
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1-ti
The sign of the partial effect of an increase in the minimum wage
for unskilled workers on the level of output in the formal sector
depends thus on the sign of (e - Giventhe definitions above,
L ________ 8 — _______ - (AlO) U U
(as)
E+ LL5 +L- 37-









as long as < a, that is, as long as the minimuiiwagefor
unskilled labor in the formal sector is lower than the efficiency wage
earned by skilled workers.





Thus, in the two particular cases considered above, the sign of
the partial effect of an increase in the minimum wage on output in the
formal sector differ.29We can also derive, however, a general
condition for this result to obtain for 1 > thatis, the case
for which the substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers
is not too large. Using equation (AlO) yields













29Notethat if4 1(the production function is linear and
skilled and unskilled labor are perfectly substitutable inputs), firms
in the formal sector would never hire skilled workers since in
equilibrium ">
wu•- 38-
whichis always negative, regardless of the optimal level of effort.
Note that a sufficient condition for sg(3QF/&4) <0is that a1 or -y
be relatively close to unity. Equivalently, the share of the informal
sector must be large, or the formal sector must be labor intensive.
Consider now the effect of a real exchange rate depreciation on
output of the informal sector. From the production function defined
earlier, we have
A
sg( )— - sg(l+
Equation(A7) yields




sg( )— - sg(e(-.rE)+n(l-1)].
(Al2)
The quantity in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (A12)
is unambiguously positive if -y>E.Ifthis condition holds, then
8q1/az <0,as indicated in the text.- 39-
AppendixII
This Appendix provides a formal derivation of the slope of the
unemployment Laffer curve. From equations (20') and (28), we have
+ -s}
-g—0, (Al)
where g —+ z1g1.From this equation we infer that
d
a -(l+LaL)P1 sg —- sg *d , (A2) .di -
where —- d1nI4/d1nidenotes the elasticity of the demand for
skilled labor. It is readily apparent that if is low, the curve is
downward sloping. From (Al) we have
*d<a,
so that the Laffer curveisupward-sloping if the elasticity of the
demand for skilled labor in the formal sector satisfies
< <a,
and it reaches the highest for —
Togain further insight,it is useful to use a linear
approximation of the demand for labor function, 1 - Using
equation (28) in the text,
10
-ali1/(li).Substituting this







1 - - g-0, (A3)- 40-
whichis represented in Figure 4.The efficient frontier is defined
by the leftward portion of the ellipsoid.Note that one should add
the requirement that expected utility of a skilled worker exceed his
utility as unskilled.This implies that the lowest portion of the
efficient frontier is not attainable.
It is straightforward to show that a reduction in total
government spending g leads to a leftward shiftof the efficient
frontier- -thusreducting the tax rate needed to support a given
level of unemployment compensation for skilled workers. An increase
in the parameter measuring the wage efficiency premium a shifts the
efficient frontier downwards, because it implies that a given
unemployment compensation and given taxes are associated with higher
cost for skilled labor.To compensate for it, holding the tax rate
given, requires a lower wage benefit.Finally, a reduction in the
supply of skilled labor implies that, for a given unemployment
benefit, that unemployment is smaller, hence the tax rate required to
finance the benefit scheme is lower. The efficient frontier shifts
leftwards in this case.- 41-
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